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Introduction
On January 30, 2003, Belgium became the second country in the
world to allow same-sex partners to marry.1 The state began processing
same-sex marriages inJune 2003. This legislation marks a step forward for
supporters of same-sex marriages around the globe. Belgium's actions fol-
lowed those of the Netherlands, which passed similar legislation in April
2001.2 The Netherlands' Act produced immediate results, as 2,400 same-
sex marriages took place during the remaining nine months of 2001, fol-
lowed by approximately 1,900 in 2002.3 These two countries have begun a
trend in family law that some had previously dismissed as an isolated inci-
dent in the Netherlands. 4 As the number of same-sex marriages increases
in these two countries, the chance that same-sex spouses will seek recogni-
tion in another European Union state also increases. This may lead to the
European Court of Justice5 ("ECJ") having to decide whether to recognize
these relationships.
Throughout the European Union ("EU" or the "Union"), there are
movements towards recognizing same-sex partnerships. 6 Although no
other country has adopted legislation allowing marriage, many govern-
ments, including those of Sweden, Denmark, and France, have created rec-
ognition systems,7 which often give same-sex partners the same legal rights
as married couples. 8 Additionally, many other member states that do not
have recognition schemes are currently considering same-sex partnership
laws in their parliamentary bodies.9 Amid this liberalization stands the
European Union, a body that began as an alliance aimed at strengthening
member states' economies, but now holds greater social and cultural signif-
icance. 1 0 Today, the ECJ rules on issues concerning social policy, 1 which
may in the near future include same-sex marriages. With such rulings, the
1. See Belgium Bill, Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 5e Session de la
50e legislature, Doc 59 2165/001, Jan. 30, 2003.
2. See generally Acts of 21 December 2000, Stb. 2001, nos. 9 and 10 (allowing
registration that grants similar legal effects as marriage in the Netherlands).
3. More Marriages and More Partnerships, Statistics Netherlands Press, Ministry of
Economic Affairs, Release PB02-244 (Nov. 27, 2002), available at www.cbs.nl (noting
that between January and April 2003 there were approximately 722 same-sex marriages
in the Netherlands).
4. See Equal Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, Equality and Marriage: Around the
World (Feb. 2003), available at www.samesexmarriage.ca/equality/world.html.
5. The European Court of Justice was set up by the EU to judge conflicts concern-
ing EU law.
6. Heather Hunt, Diversity and the European Union: Grant v. SWT, the Treaty of
Amsterdam, and the Free Movement of Persons, 27 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 633, 637-40
(1999) (discussing many of the registered partnership schemes).
7. Id.
8. See H.L. Bill, infra note 8 (noting the UK proposed registered partnership legisla-
tion), Danish Act, infra note 41.
9. See, e.g., infra note 59 (noting that the British government is developing a regis-
tered partnership scheme).
10. See generally, MacLean, infra note 92 (discussing the ways in which political and
social influences impact member states).
11. See infra note 16 (outlining the evolution of the ECJ's opinions on human rights
law in the EC's member states).
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ECJ has created tension among conservative member states that would pre-
fer to continue to act as they see fit.12
Although other member states are moving toward recognizing same-
sex relationships, the Netherlands and Belgium are the only states that
treat same-sex and opposite-sex partners the same for purposes of mar-
riage.13 Changes in the domestic laws of these countries, however, could
significantly impact the recognition of same-sex relationships throughout
the European Union. 14 Not only is it possible that the Dutch and Belgian
actions will prompt member states to take action domestically I5 but it is
also possible that their actions could lead to an ECJ decision (whose rul-
ings, traditionally, member states strictly follow) on the subject of same-
sex marriages. 16 While the ECJ may decide to respect the internal affairs
of the member states concerning marriage, 17 issues concerning Article 39
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 18 (which calls for the
free movement of workers within the European Community) could compel
the ECJ to consider whether member states should now recognize same-sex
relationships as legal marriages. 19
If the ECJ were to find that member states should give standing to
same-sex marriages under Article 39, a new issue might then arise as to
whether a member state can excuse itself from recognizing these mar-
riages.20 An excusal would most likely take the form of an amendment to
a European Community ("EC" or "Community") treaty and require a unan-
imous vote of support by the member states.2 1 In light of the current trend
towards recognition of non-traditional unions and the pressures on states
to eliminate discrimination, one or more member states might object to
12. See generally David O'Connor, Limiting "Public Morality" Exceptions to Free Move-
ment in Europe: Ireland's Role in a Changing European Union, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 695
(1997)(arguing that Ireland feels internal tensions due to its desire to remain economi-
cally tied to the EC but wants to retain its conservative stance on social issues).
13. See YuvAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEx COUPLES 122 (2002)(noting that the
Netherlands has imposed some restrictions on same-sex partners' right to adopt chil-
dren from foreign countries due to fears that some conservative countries might limit
Dutch heterosexual couples from adopting because of concern that the children may
eventually find their way into homosexual couples' homes).
14. See Nicholas Patterson, The Repercussions in the European Union of the Nether-
lands' Same-Sex Marriage Law, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 301, 304 (2001).
15. CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
Nov. 10, 1997, OJ. (C 326), pt. 1, art. 13. (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY] (noting the
right of free movement of people).
16. See generally Elizabeth F. Defeis, Human Rights and the European Union: Who
Decides? Possible Conflicts Between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of
Human Rights, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 301 (2001) (noting that the ECJ has begun taking the
lead in infusing the Community with social and moral standards).
17. See Patterson, supra note 14, at 304.
18. EC TREATY, supra note 15.
19. Cf. Patterson supra note 14 (arguing that the ECJ may be coming closer to having
to decide on a case involving same-sex marriage recognition).
20. EC TREATY, supra note 15, art. 300(5) (citing Article 48 of the TREATY ON EURO-
PEAN UNION, which states that if a member state does not want to abide by a ruling, it
would need to attempt to be excused).
21. EC TREATY, supra note 15, art. 300(5).
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another's petition to amend an EC treaty. This would create a novel predic-
ament for the European Union.
This Note argues that if the ECJ were to decide in favor of recognizing
the legal rights of married same-sex couples, which is possible due to the
legal changes occurring within the EC's member states, some member
states might want to seek excusal from the ruling. Furthermore, if these
excusals were refused, there would be both political and social backlash
within the EC, as member states would not quietly approve restrictions on
their sovereignty. Section I will provide the necessary background to this
argument by describing the legislation and policies of both member and
non-member states concerning same-sex unions. Section II will then illus-
trate how a member state can attempt to opt out of an ECJ ruling and
discuss the Irish Abortion Protocol, in which opting out actually occurred.
Section III will analyze this argument using a hypothetical case to show
how a claim would make its way through the ECJ and how the European
Community could respond to the decision. Finally, Section IV will con-
sider how the issue of recognizing same-sex marriages might affect mem-
bership policies within the European Union and how the ECJ's decision
reflects on the Union as a whole.
I. The Emergence of Same-Sex Recognition and the Chances of a
Member State Opting Out of a European Court of Justice
Ruling to Expand Recognition Within the European
Community
A. Same-Sex Marriage in the Netherlands and Belgium
In 2000, the Netherlands amended existing family law to give same-
sex couples the right to marry and the right to adopt Dutch children. 22
This legislation changed existing law that limited same-sex couples to regis-
tering their partnerships. Although registration gave these couples many
maintenance and recognition rights, it did not carry the same political and
social impact embodied by the recognition of marriage, which carries sym-
bolic and legal implications. Furthermore, registration made it easier to
pass the accompanying legislation concerning adoption.2 3
When Belgium's House of Representatives decided in favor of allowing
same-sex marriages, the isolated Dutch case began to look like a trend of
things to come. 24 The Belgium Bill allows same-sex partners to marry
under the same system as opposite-sex partners rather than creating a new
process for same-sex marriages. 25 Unlike the Netherlands' system, Belgian
22. Acts of 21 December 2000, supra note 2 (Article 1 of the Act amends the existing
family law and allows for a registered partnership between two persons of the same sex
with the same legal effect as marriage).
23. See Kees Waaldijk, The Latest News About Same-Sex Marriage in the Netherlands
(What It Implies for Foreigners) (Jan. 2003), available at http://
www.meijers.leidenuniv.nl (indicating that there was some resistance in allowing same-
sex couples the right to adopt children before the marriage law was introduced).
24. Belgium Bill, supra note 1, was ratified with a vote of 91 to 22.
25. Id.
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law only allows same-sex marriages when the national law of each partner
would allow the marriage. Thus, when in Belgium, a Belgian can enter into
a same-sex marriage only with another Belgian or with a Dutch citizen. 26
Furthermore, the Belgium Bill does not allow a same-sex couple to adopt
children, nor does it create a presumed parental right for a female in her
partner's biological children. 27 Belgium's recent legislation raises the
question of whether the other member states of the European Union will
follow the Netherlands' approach to recognizing same-sex marriages.
B. Grant v. South-West Trains: Confronting Same-Sex Partnerships in the
European Court of Justice Before Same-Sex Marriages Were
Recognized
The ECJ came close to confronting the recognition of same-sex rela-
tionships within the European Community in the case of Grant v. South-
West Trains.28 Grant was an employee of South-West Trains and her con-
tract granted concessions to herself, her spouse, her dependents,2 9 and a
common law spouse upon approval. 30 South-West Trains refused to grant
travel concessions to Grant's girlfriend of over two years, even though the
company gave concessions to a male employee's girlfriend. 3 1 The ECJ held
that South-West Trains' refusal to grant travel concessions to Grant's same-
sex partner was not discrimination and that the concessions could be lim-
ited to partners of the opposite sex. 3 2 Aside from finding that there was no
discrimination, 33 the ECJ also commented that the law in most member
states did not treat "stable relationships between two persons of the same
sex ... as equivalent to marriages or stable relationships outside marriage
between persons of opposite sex."'3 4 Therefore, the ECJ found that employ-
ers did not have to treat a same-sex partnership the same as a marriage or a
stable heterosexual relationship outside of marriage. 35
In contrast, the ECJ might handle a claim by a married same-sex
couple from Belgium or the Netherlands quite differently today. In Grant,
the ECJ stated that one of the main reasons employers did not have to treat
same-sex partnerships as equivalent to opposite-sex relationships was that
most member states did not treat same-sex partnerships equally. 3 6 Over
the past few years, however, member states have enacted laws that give
legal status to relationships outside of traditional marriage, including the
26. See Equal Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, Equality and Marriage: Around the
World, supra note 4.
27. Id. Cf. supra note 2.
28. Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains, Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. 1-621 (1998).
29. Id. at 1-623.
30. Id.
31. Paul Spackman, Grant v. South-West Trains: Equality for Same-Sex Partners in the
European Community, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1063, 1102 (1997).
32. Id.
33. Case C-249/96 (finding no gender discrimination because the rule applied
equally to same-sex partnerships involving both men and women).
34. Id. at 1-648.
35. Id. at 1-652.
36. Id. at 1-648.
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recognition of same-sex partnerships. 3 7 Although member states have not
developed identical or, in some cases, similar legal recognition schemes,
many now acknowledge same-sex partnerships as being legally analogous
to marriage or heterosexual cohabitation and, in the case of the Nether-
lands, equal to heterosexual marriage. 38
C. Evolution of Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Within the
European Community and Nations Outside the European
Community
In 1989, Denmark became one of the first European countries to give
same-sex partners the same political rights as heterosexual spouses. 3 9
This legislation experienced initial delays due to fear that recognizing
same-sex partnerships would produce domestic hostility. In addition,
lawmakers were worried about foreign perceptions regarding whether Den-
mark would expect general recognition of its legalized same-sex partner-
ships by outside states.40 The legislature, however, overcame these
concerns and passed the Danish Act. 41 For Danish recognition of a same-
sex partnership, the partners must register their relationship with the gov-
ernment. 4 2 Under this system, the same legal requirements apply to same-
sex partnerships and conventional marriages;4 3 for instance, age require-
ments, prohibitions against sibling unions, and prohibitions against regis-
tering without the dissolution of previous partnerships. 4 4
In 1995, Sweden introduced a registered partnership model that is
both factually and legally similar to a marriage but uses different terminol-
ogy. 4 5 The Swedish requirements are similar to those of the Danish Act,
but the Swedish Act only applies to partnerships after two years and is
limited to same-sex partners (unlike the Danish Act where the partnership
can be an opposite-sex couple), although they do not have to be homosexu-
als.46 Registered partnerships in Sweden have almost all of the conse-
quences of a marriage, 4 7 including financial support.48 There are many in
Sweden who would like to see same-sex partners receive more rights and
37. See, e.g., Danish Act, infra note 41; French Registered Partnership Act, infra note
53.
38. Acts of 21 December 2000, supra note 2; see also Hunt, supra note 5.
39. Act No. 372 of 7 June 1989 [hereinafter Danish Act].
40. Morton P. Broberg, The Registered Partnership for Same-Sex Couples in Denmark,
8(2) CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 149 (1996).
41. Danish Act, supra note 39. The Danish Act was passed in 1989.
42. Cf. Nygh, infra note 46 (explaining that this registration consists of filing papers,
which declare the intention to have the relationship recognized and provides partners
with certain rights and obligations similar to those of a marriage, while in other nations,
legal recognition of the relationship comes after a set amount of time).
43. See id. There is a difference, demonstrated by the fact that a same-sex partner-
ship does not receive the solemnization of a marriage.
44. Danish Act, supra note 39.
45. See Nygh, infra note 46, at 11. Cf. Danish Act, supra note 41.
46. Peter Nygh, Homosexual Partnerships in Sweden, AusTL. J. FAM. L., 11 (1997).
47. Id. Under the 1995 Swedish Act, a same-sex couple cannot adopt children, one
partner alone cannot adopt, and artificial reproduction is not allowed. If custody issues
arise over biological children from prior relationships, the same-sex partner can be seen
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there is similar support to pass formal marriage laws. 4 9 Swedish registered
partnerships are not currently recognized in countries with similar legisla-
tion, such as Denmark and Norway.5 0
France is another EU member state that adopted legislation 5 l allowing
two persons of the same sex to enter into a registered partnership. The
purpose behind the legislation, as put forth by French officials, was to
allow partners to organize their lives together better.5 2 Registered partners
receive the rights and obligations of marriage, including tax benefits and
property rights.53 However, there are differences between registered part-
nerships and traditional marriages, such as inheritance rights, rights con-
cerning children, and methods of dissolution. 5 4 Prior to passage, the
French government experienced some difficulties in gaining political sup-
port for the partnership system; many French officials worried that regis-
tered partnerships would harm the institution of marriage and some did
not believe that the state should support relationships other than mar-
riage.5 5 The drafters thought that a bill that applied to everyone could gain
more support than a bill singling out same-sex partners.5 6 In light of this
conflict, France decided to include both homosexual and heterosexual
partners in the legislation. 57
In the United Kingdom (UK), traditionally one of the more conserva-
tive EU member states, 58 there are currently plans to implement civil part-
nership legislation. The movement towards equal rights for same-sex
couples in the UK had a breakthrough with legislation proposed in the
House of Lords that would have allowed same-sex partners to enter into
civil partnerships.5 9 The Civil Partnerships Bill60 would have allowed for
as a stepparent, as if the partnership were a marriage. Swedish officials claim this is not
discrimination because Swedish law does not recognize the right to have a child.
48. Id. However, some financial benefits such as widow's pensions are not given to
the partners.
49. See Marianne Del Po Kulow, Same-Sex Marriage: A Scandinavian Perspective, 24
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv 419, n.120 (2002) (discussing the movement towards
same-sex marriage in Scandinavia).
50. Id. (noting that the rights available to same-sex married partners in Sweden are
not available to those partners who move to a foreign country).
51. LOI no. 99-944 du 15 novembre relative du pacte civil de solidarite et du concu-
binage (PaCS) (1999) [hereinafter French Registered Partnership Act].
52. Eva Steiner, The Spirit of the New French Registered Partnership Law: Promoting
Autonomy and Pluralism or Weakening Marriage? 12(1) CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 1, 4 (2000).
53. French Registered Partnership Act, supra note 53.
54. E.g., Steiner, supra note 52 (noting that a same-sex partner will not have a clear
right to the partners' children).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partners But Not Parents/Recognizing Parents But
Not Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the United States 17 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS. 711, 725-26 (2000); French Registered Partnership Act, supra note 53, art.
515-1 (specifying that the act covers civil partnerships between heterosexual as well as
homosexual couples).
58. See Low, infra note 78 (describing the United Kingdom as a nation with church-
state relations).
59. Civil Partnerships Bill (Civil Partnerships Act 2001), 2001 (Eng.) [hereinafter
H.L. Bill].
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the registering of unions, thereby allowing same-sex partners to enjoy
many of the benefits and obligations given to married spouses, such as
property rights, inheritance rights, and bereavement damages. 6 1 The Civil
Rights Bill was withdrawn from consideration after the UK government
announced that it would be introducing its own civil partnership legisla-
tion.6 2 This action, although creating controversy within the UK, 63 is con-
sistent with the state's efforts to accept and integrate the Human Rights
Act.6 4 The recent announcement by the British government that it would
begin to allow civil partnership registration in the near future is a develop-
ment occurring sooner than activists originally expected.65
While member states are beginning to reform domestic same-sex part-
nership policy, pressure towards liberalization is also coming from outside
the European Union, as other nations create laws that recognize and pro-
tect same-sex relationships. 66 Countries such as Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and Norway have started to adopt progressive same-sex partner-
ship reforms affecting property and maintenance law.6 7 While the legal
rights given to same-sex partners vary among the different Canadian prov-
inces and Australian territories, 68 both countries, in addition to New Zea-
land and Norway, have developed laws recognizing same-sex partnerships.
The countries' recognition methods range from Norway's practice of grant-
ing property rights for de facto partners-regardless of whether there is a
conjugal relationship 69 -to Australia's overhaul of civil law to grant same-
sex couples a bulk of the rights given to married couples. 70 Indicative of
the ever-changing nature of these recognition schemes, appeals courts in
60. Id.
61. Gay Marriage Bill to be Launched, (BBC News, Jan. 10, 2002), available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk.
62. H.L. Bill, supra note 59.
63. Gay Groups Hail Partnership Bill (BBC News, Nov. 26, 2003), available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk.
64. Clare Archbold, Family Law Making and Human Rights in the United Kingdom, in
MAKING LAW FOR FAMILIES 186 (Mavis MacLean ed., 2000). Once the Act is integrated,
there will be more pressure on the government to comply with the European Convention
on Human Rights and to make the political process more public allowing equality issues
to be openly addressed.
65. Supra note 61.
66. See infra notes 68 and 69.
67. Id.
68. Compare New South Wales legislation (The Property (Relationships) Legislation
Amendment Act 1999 No. 4), with Tazmania (The De Facto Relationship Bill 1999),
which does not give rights to same-sex partner. Compare also Quebec's An Act to Amend
Various Legislative Provisions Concerning De Facto Spouses, R.S.Q., ch. 14 (1999), with
Alberta's Marriage Act, R.S.A., ch. M-5 (2000), which states that marriage is "between a
man and a woman" and declares that Alberta will stand by this definition regardless of
whether the Supreme Court of Canada decides differently.
69. Compare Norway's Law on Joint Households (allowing property to be taken over
by non-owning cohabitants if they have been living together for two years or have a
mutual child, and not requiring a conjugal relationship), with New Zealand's Property
(Relationships) Act (including not only same-sex partners in the definition of de facto
partnerships, but also including a conjugal element as of 2002).
70. See New South Wales legislation (The Property (Relationships) Legislation
Amendment Act 1999).
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three Canadian provinces have recently decided that traditional definitions
of marriage violate the rights of same-sex couples and now require the pro-
vincial governments to enact laws allowing same-sex marriage. 7 1
II. Ability of a Member State to Opt Out of a Decision of the
European Court of Justice and an Examination of the Irish
Abortion Protocol
If the ECJ follows the emerging trend towards recognition, member
states would be compelled to follow the decision.7 2 Consequently, a major
issue may arise as to whether or not a member state can excuse itself from
recognizing a marriage that occurred in the Netherlands or in Belgium. If
a member state wants to opt out of an ECJ interpretation of EC law-so that
it may continue to follow a legal regime that is inconsistent with the law
applied to the other member states-the EC Treaty 73 requires an amend-
ment to a European Union treaty. Article 300(5) of the EC Treaty states
that if the Council of the European Union ("Council") plans to amend the
EC Treaty, it must follow Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU): 74 Any member state can propose an amendment to the treaty,
allowing the Council to convene a conference where representatives from
each member state review the proposals.7 5 However, according to Article
48, "amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the mem-
ber states. ' 76 Thus, if any member state objects to the proposed amend-
ment, it will fail. 7
7
Although requesting protocols to treaties is an unusual way for a coun-
try in the EU to retain some sovereignty, 7 8 countries such as the United
Kingdom, France, and Denmark have all engaged in making protocols. 7 9
Therefore, given the conservative standpoint of some member states, some
of those states may attempt a form of opting out. Furthermore, if a
nation's request for a protocol to amend a treaty is not allowed, it is possi-
ble that the nation may threaten to veto a treaty or even to withdraw from
the Community altogether. 80
The European Union faced a situation comparable to the same-sex
marriage debate when an amendment resulted from a disagreement over
71. Three cases were brought in different Canadian territories all of which reached
different decisions. See EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), Hendricks
and Leboeuf v. The Attorney General of Canada (Court File No. 500-05-059656-007),
and Halpern v. The Attorney General of Canada, Ontario Superior Court of Justice
(Divisional Court), Court File No. 684/00.
72. Defeis, supra note 16 (member states traditionally are influenced by and follow
ECJ opinions, which are binding on the member states).
73. EC TREATY, supra note 15, at art. 300(5).
74. Id. at art. 300(5) (which cites Article 48 of the TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION).
75. See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Oct. 2, 1997, OJ. art. 48 (1997).
76. Id.
77. Id. This is indicated in the text of Article 48.
78. See Shelley Low, Europe Threatens the Sovereignty of the Republic of Ireland: Free-
dom of Information and the Right to Life, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 175, 191 (2001).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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the Irish Abortion Protocol ("the Protocol") of 1992.81 In 1989, the ECJ
ruled on a case concerning Irish students who were disseminating infor-
mation on abortion clinics located abroad.8 2 The ECJ ruled that the stu-
dents could not distribute the information and relied heavily on the
provisions of the EC Treaty, which state that member nations should be
allowed to control legislation in areas affecting moral matters in their socie-
ties.83 During the Maastricht Treaty ratification in 1992, the Irish govern-
ment used this ruling to obtain Protocol 17, an amendment that stated that
no provision of the EC Treaty would affect the domestic application of the
Irish Constitution's prohibition on conducting and assisting abortions.8 4
Public sentiment towards the Protocol changed while the government
shaped the amendment.85 In a case, later known as the X case, the court
denied an endangered 14-year-old girl pregnant with her rapist's child of
the right to travel abroad to receive an abortion.86 On appeal, the Irish
Supreme Court held that a mother could obtain an abortion if childbirth
would endanger her life. Thus, the court lifted the injunction prohibiting
the young girl from obtaining an abortion. 7 This decision required the
Irish government to ensure that an endangered woman could travel abroad
to procure an abortion.88
In light of the X case, the government feared that the Irish people
would not ratify the Treaty with the Protocol. The government sought to
amend the Protocol, but the other European states refused to reopen the
issue. 89 Instead, the states created the Solemn Declaration, which stated
that the Protocol did not intend to limit the freedom of travel between
member states or to limit the flow of information allowed under Irish
law. 90 The Declaration stated that the Maastricht Treaty permitted the X
Case decision, and Ireland finally ratified the Treaty in 1992.9 1 The inclu-
sion of extra provisions in the Maastricht Treaty shows how Irish public
sentiment shaped the EU, which raises the question of how the EU should
81. Protocol Annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaties Establish-
ing the European Communities, 1992 OJ. (C 224) 130.
82. Soc'y for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ir) Ltd. v. Grogan et. al., [1990] 1
C.M.L.R. 689 (Ir.).
83. Id. (citing EEC TREATY, arts. 36, 56, and 66).
84. IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3 (1937).
85. G. Diane Lee, Note, Ireland's Constitutional Protection of the Unborn: Is it in Dan-
ger?, 7 TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 413, 426 (2000) (explaining that the EU is given poten-
tial jurisdiction over social and cultural activities within its territory). The European
Union countries intended the Maastricht Treaty to further unity and involved a reduc-
tion in each state's sovereignty.
86. Attorney General v. X, [1992] 2 C.M.L.R. 277 (Ir.).
87. Id.
88. Lee, supra note 85, at 431.
89. Amy M. Buckley, The Primacy of Democracy over Natural Law in Irish Abortion
Law: An Examination of the C Case, 9 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 275, 288 (1998) (noting
that the Protocol left the issue open for Irish law to decide). Lee, supra note 85, at 431.
90. Buckley, supra note 89, at 289 (citing the Solemn Declaration).
91. See RICHARD B. FINNEGAN, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MEMBER STATES: COOPER-
ATION, COORDINATION, AND COMPROMISE 180 (Eleanor E. Zeff & Ellen B. Pirro eds., 2001)
(explaining that the vote of the people for the Treaty may show a preference for the EU
over certain social policy issues).
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defer to the preferences of individual member states.92
III. The Consequences of a Same-Sex Couple's Recognition Claim in
the European Court of Justice
A. Challenge to the Refusal to Recognize a Same-Sex Marriage
The growing number of same-sex couples in the EU and the rise in
same-sex marriages in Belgium and the Netherlands increases the likeli-
hood that a same-sex married couple will move from these countries to
another EU member state. If this hypothetical family unit moves, the
spouses may want to transfer their rights and obligations from the Nether-
lands or Belgium to the other country, which may not grant them the same
entitlements as given to heterosexual couples. The spouses could then sue
in the local court system, or Belgium or the Netherlands could sue the
other member state in the ECJ, to enforce the spouses' rights.
93
1. The Freedom of Movement Provision in the European Community Treaty
If the ECJ hears such a challenge, it could analyze the case under the
Free Flow of Workers and the Freedom of Movement provision of the EC
Treaty. 94 This provision seeks to encourage movement in the EU and guar-
antees that citizens of a member state enjoy the same rights in other mem-
ber states. Article 39(1) of the EC Treaty gives workers the freedom of
movement, 95 and Article 39(2) assures workers equal treatment regarding
working conditions and social benefits.96 This provision prohibits mea-
sures that would disadvantage individuals more than they would be disad-
vantaged in their home state. 97 Article 39 indicates that the ECJ will take
great measures to promote the charter's goal of unity by declaring restric-
tions on the free movement of EU citizens illegal.
To encourage movement and restrict discrimination against citizens
traveling between member states, the governments must respect social
92. See LAURA CRAM, POLICY-MAKING IN THE EU: CONCEPTUAL LENSES AND THE INTEGRA-
TION PROCESS 58-59 (1997); see also Donald A. MacLean, Note, Can the EC Kill the Irish
Unborn? An Investigation of the European Community's Ability to Impinge on the Moral
Sovereignty of Member States, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 527, 528 (1999).
93. See ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 40 (1999)
(noting that an action can be brought to the ECJ by many different parties but it is often
difficult for individuals to be granted standing). However, an individual could possibly
bring an action in a member state's local courts and seek a preliminary ECJ ruling.
94. MacLean, supra note 92, at 540 (explaining that the ECJ's main purpose is to
"ensure the four freedoms").
95. THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (TREATY OF ROME),
Mar. 25, 1957, art. 48, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 36 (1957) [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
96. Id.
97. ANDREW EVANS, A TEXTBOOK OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW (1998). This opposes the
idea that the prohibition is against denying national treatment to persons moving
between member states or simply not being denied access to employment. This ten-
dency of the Court of Justice is cited here as emerging in part from Case C-19/92 Dieter
Kraus v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1663, and the Opinion of Advocate
General Capotorti in Case 55/77 Maris v. Rijksdienst voor Werknemerspensioenen,
1977 E.C.R. 2327, at 2338.
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rights like the right of a worker's spouse to receive government or employer
support. 98 The unavailability of spousal benefits, such as insurance, could
discourage movement between countries. Thus, the ECJ could find that a
state's failure to recognize same-sex marriage obstructs freedom of move-
ment and violates the EC Treaty. 99
2. How Should the European Court of Justice Define "Spouse"?
Before the ECJ finds that same-sex marriage restrictions violate Article
39, it must decide how to define the term "spouse," an issue with which it
has previously struggled.10 0 Part Three, Title III of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community states that "freedom of movement for workers
shall be secured within the Community."' 1 1. The Council's regulations
clarify this provision. One regulation states that for a worker to enjoy the
freedom of movement he must be able to be "joined by his family."'1 2 No
clear established definition of "family" or "spouse" exists, and the ECJ has
never directly confronted the issue of whether a homosexual union quali-
fies as a family. The ECJ encountered the issue on one occasion but
declined to review it for procedural reasons. 10 3 In the Grant case, the ECJ
considered the issue of same-sex partners' rights, but drew a clear line
between same-sex relationships and marriages. 10 4 The ECJ found that
member states did not recognize same sex partners as spouses and there-
fore did not require states to give same-sex partners employment bene-
fits. 10 5 In Netherlands v. Reed, the ECJ held that the term "spouse" only
included an individual in a marital relationship. 10 6 In 2001, the ECJ dis-
tinguished registered partnerships and announced that it would no longer
require states to treat them the same as marriages. 10 7 Although the ECJ
previously decided that same-sex partners were not "spouses," the legisla-
tion in the Netherlands and Belgium has changed the circumstances.10 8
Moreover, many member states now recognize same-sex partnerships and
give them rights similar, and at times identical, to married couples. The
98. EC TREATY, supra note 15, at art. 39.
99. Nicholas J. Patterson, Note, The Repercussions in the European Union of the
Netherlands' Same-Sex Marriage Law, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 301, 303 (2001).
100. See infra notes 106-108, where the court has looked at same-sex partners.
101. EC TREATY, supra note 15, art. 39.
102. Council Regulation 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 Freedom of Movement for
Workers Within the Community (EEC).
103. Joined Cases C-122/99 & C-125/99 Sweden v. Council of the European Union,
2001 E.C.R. 1-4322 (arguing that depriving persons registered under the Swedish part-
nership legislation of "rights associated with their status under national law" was an
"obstacle to the freedom of movement for workers." Id. at 20-21. However, the court
found that this was a fresh plea brought up during the appeals stage and was therefore
not admissible. Id.
104. Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., 2 E.C.R. 1-621 (1998).
105. See id.
106. Case 59/85, Netherlands v. Reed, 1986 E.C.R. 1283, at 15.
107. Case C-122/99. This was an employment benefits case in Sweden where the
court found that the employer did not have to treat the partnership as a marriage.
108. Acts of 21 Dec. 2000, supra note 2.
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ECJ may now have to decide whether same-sex partners are "spouses" in
light of their legal marriage.
3. Possible Outcomes of the European Court of Justice Ruling
The Treaty's freedom of movement provisions encourage and acceler-
ate integration, 10 9 but member states have treated same-sex partners in a
way that undermines the provisions. The ECJ will further the goal of social
and political integration if it requires member states to recognize a mar-
riage from Belgium or the Netherlands and thereby grants same-sex mar-
ried couples equal rights. 10
The ECJ will not require state recognition if the Amsterdam Treaty jus-
tifies the restriction on the freedom of movement."' The Amsterdam
Treaty protects sexual orientation and says that EU member states should
combat discrimination in that area. 1 2 While member states may have
internal difficulties constructing valid policy reasons against recognition,
the ECJ should consider the broader problems for the EU, as a whole, if
member states fight over recognition. Political influences within the EU
may cause the ECJ to retreat from the issue. The ECJ may not want to
confront the majority of the member states, who may not be ready to recog-
nize same-sex marriages. 1 13 However, if the recent liberal expansion of
recognition laws is an indication of how member states would respond to
an ECJ ruling, many member states may not oppose recognizing same-sex
relationships. 1 4
If the ECJ declines to recognize same-sex rights, the Netherlands or
Belgium could bring a fundamental rights claim with the European Human
Rights Court. 1 5 Although a ruling from this court would compel member
states to give rights to the same-sex couples, the court likely would not find
a human rights violation. 1 6 While the court has considered acting against
discrimination based on sexual orientation, it has usually left this initiative
to national legislators." 7 Although the member states would comply with
a court order to recognize same-sex relationships, 118 the court is not likely
to reach this decision because the ECJ has already decided against
recognition. 119
109. See Spackman, supra note 31, at 1089; Note, The European Community After
1992: The Freedom of Movement of People and Its Limitations, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
643, 648 (1992).
110. See Spackman, supra note 31, at 1088.
111. See Hunt, supra note 6, at 649.
112. See EC TREATY, supra note 15, at pt. 1, art. 13; Hunt, supra note 6, at 649.
113. Patterson, supra note 99, at 304.
114. See supra notes 1, 41, 48, and 53 (describing member states' legislation support-
ing same-sex relationships).
115. See Patterson, supra note 99.
116. Id. at 305.
117. Id. at 320-22.
118. Cf. supra note 72 (explaining that the member states would respond with defer-
ence similar to that given to the EC).
119. See generally Koen Lenaerts, Respect for Fundamental Rights as a Constitutional
Principle of the European Union, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 (2000).
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B. Attempt to Opt Out of a European Court of Justice Ruling
If the ECJ decides to recognize same-sex relationships, Article 5 of the
EC Treaty would oblige member states to adopt the ECJ ruling. 120 Some
member states, however, might seek to excuse themselves from the ruling.
This excusal could resemble Ireland's Abortion Protocol. 121 Just as Ireland
pressured other member states to vote unanimously for the Protocol, 1 22 a
few member states might desire a similar vote to opt-out of the ECJ's ruling.
A country with a conservative stance towards same-sex partnerships, such
as Ireland, may seek to enforce its sovereignty and request an exemp-
tion.12 3 To receive an exemption, the other member states must unani-
mously approve the excusal. 124 In light of the current trend of member
states legislating to help same-sex partners, a few member states will likely
disapprove of excusals. 12 5 The more conservative member states might
then retaliate and refuse to ratify the next major treaty or otherwise
obstruct the Community's progress. Nations such as the Netherlands and
Belgium have a great interest in having their laws respected, and as the
number of same-sex marriages increases, many citizens might oppose
bending on this issue in order to placate other countries. Furthermore, EU
pressure on the Netherlands or Belgium might encourage these nations to
withdraw from the EU. 126
As laws increasingly accept homosexual relationships, more Europe-
ans will consider same-sex relationships a part of everyday society. 127
Accordingly, more states will accept the legal responsibilities of recognition
and adopt corresponding legislation,1 28 and European countries and their
citizenry will also become more inclined to recognize all married spouses
within their borders and less inclined to allow exceptions. The Nether-
lands and Belgium already recognize same-sex marriages. 12 9 Sweden and
Denmark have also developed progressive reforms over the last few
years. 130 The governments and citizens of these countries may not want to
make exceptions that allow some countries to refuse recognition of same-
sex marriages. Finally, as some Canadian provinces grant same-sex
couples a constitutional right to marry, the EU member states will have
one more political obstacle to conquer if they want to deny recognition
120. EC TREATY, supra note 15, art. 5.
121. Supra text accompanying note 78.
122. Supra note 75 and accompanying text. To pass the amendment, all member
states had to agree.
123. Supra note 78 and accompanying text.
124. EC TRFATY, supra note 15, art. 48 (stating that the member state would need to
pass through the provisions of Article 48 without objection).
125. Supra note 114 (referencing member states' legislation supporting same-sex
partnerships).
126. See supra note 3.
127. MERIN, supra note 13, at 94 (discussing the development of Swedish law and the
evolution of society's way of thinking about homosexuals).
128. The start of this trend can be seen through developing legislation. For example,
see supra notes 1, 2, and 65.
129. See Belgium Bill, supra note 1; Acts of 21 December 2000, supra note 2.
130. See Danish Act, supra note 41; see Nygh, supra note 48.
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rights.1 3 ' Other countries that allow same-sex marriage may sufficiently
pressure the ECJ and other member states into giving marriage rights to
same-sex partners. 13 2 Thus, with many member states under pressure to
continue reforming their policies on same-sex partnerships, there would be
considerable pressure to oppose an excepting amendment to the ECJ
ruling.
A disagreement between member states over protocol possibilities
could create many problems for the EU.13 3 Although the ECJ would likely
want to "promote the supremacy of EU law and its uniform application to
all member states,"'13 4 it might hesitate to pressure states for fear that they
might attempt to withdraw from the EU. 13 5 The ECJ rulings concerning
Ireland limited the state's sovereignty and its attempts at domestic abortion
policy. 1 36 The ECJ was willing to restrict Ireland's sovereignty
13 7 but
might not be willing to restrict other member states. Ireland and countries
in a similar economically dependent situation have less political lever-
age. 138 These countries have prospered extensively under the EU system
and would not willingly withdraw and abandon this prosperity. 139 How-
ever, economically-independent countries, such as the United Kingdom,
could more easily act on withdrawal threats. 140 Although a nation's threat
to withdraw would not preclude the ECJ from conceding rights to same-sex
partners under particular circumstances, 14 1 the ECJ may not want to lose
member states and may therefore avoid any decision that states might con-
sider extreme. However, if the Court were to guide its analysis of EC law
around the preferences of particular member states, it would be acting con-
trary to the goals of the EU by emphasizing politics over legal analysis.
14 2
131. EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), Hendricks and Leboeuf v.
The Attorney General of Canada (Court File No. 500-05-059656-007), and Halpern v.
The Attorney General of Canada, Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Division Court),
Court File No. 684/00; see supra note 66 and accompanying text (noting that the EC
may feel pressure to liberalize as the rest of the world begins to reform in order to escape
appearing as if the EC does not promote human rights).
132. Cf. CRAM, supra note 95, at 47 (explaining that the Maastricht Treaty declares a
commitment by member states to promote the EU social policy, including quality of life
standards and solidarity among the member states).
133. See id.
134. Lee, supra note 85, at 432.
135. Low, supra note 78, at 192 (noting that the United Kingdom is an example of a
member state that continually threatens to withdraw from the EU).
136. See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 701-02 (noting that this occurred even though
Ireland is a highly religious society where issues such as abortion produce much public
emotion).
137. Id.
138. See Low, supra note 78, at 191 (discussing how the United Kingdom, Northern
Ireland, France, Denmark, and Portugal have all been able to secure Protocols similar to
Ireland's Abortion Protocol, yet none of these countries are particularly economically
dependent on the EC).
139. See id.
140. Id. at 191-92.
141. See Patterson, supra note 99, at 307.
142. See Note, supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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IV. Effects on the European Union
The ECJ must create an atmosphere of "harmonious development" 143
in which the member states can grow economically with little division. To
achieve this atmosphere, which is one of the main goals of the EU, the ECJ
must create a community that has "real powers stemming from a limitation
of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Commu-
nity."144 For the EC to function, the member states must accept that, inevi-
tably, ECJ rulings may occasionally limit their sovereignty and conflict
with their social policy. 145
In light of the possible emergence of a decision recognizing same-sex
couples, the issue of true integration within the EU becomes relevant. As
member states make protocols to treaties and some countries become more
politically and economically powerful than others, there appears to be a
division between those who hold power within the EU and those who fol-
low. 1 4 6 The United Kingdom wields a great deal of power within the EU
and can effectively veto any EU social measures. 14 7 If the European Union
is meant to help protect the fundamental rights of citizens, 148 there may
need to be a limit to the amount of exceptions it will make for individual
countries. 149
The EU or the ECJ will most likely consider an individual member
state's public interests when deciding how much to defer to that state. 150
The European Human Rights Convention allows states to protect their sov-
ereignty under certain circumstances 1 5 1 using a margin of appreciation
approach, which considers local public sentiment when making legal deter-
minations. Once issues such as public order and opinion have been taken
into account, 15 2 those member states who do not wish to abide by the
rulings of the ECJ can stretch this concept indefinitely. 1 53 Continued
acceptance of state defiance and amendments to treaties may call into
question the effectiveness of the EU as an integrated body. Instead, the EU
may appear more like a loosely organized attempt at creating a federalized
143. EEC TREATY, supra note 95, at art. 2; see also O'Connor, supra note 12, at 714
(citing EEC TREATY art. 2).
144. MacLean, supra note 92, at 537-38 (quoting Joined Cases 14 & 6/64, Costa v.
Ente Nazionale per L'Energia Elettrica, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425).
145. See id. at 528 (giving the example of the EC's opposition to abortion and its
impact on Irish sovereignty).
146. See Low, supra note 78, at 191-92 (comparing the strong influence of the United
Kingdom against the status of Ireland).
147. CRAM, supra note 92, at 59.
148. Bruce Carolan, Rights of Sexual Minorities in Ireland and Europe: Rhetoric Versus
Reality, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 387, 395-96 (2001) (analyzing the Charter of Fundamental
Rights and Treaty on the European Union).
149. EC TREATY, supra note 15. Currently, there is no limitation to the exceptions.
150. See Low, supra note 78, at 193.
151. Id.
152. Supra note 78 (noting the United Kingdom's church-state relations as an
example).
153. See Low, supra note 78, at 193.
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system.1 54
The EU is generally viewed as a progressive body set on developing a
system of non-discrimination. However, if the EC is compelled to defer to
the individual wishes of conservative member states, it may create laws
that, in reality, do not protect such individual citizens as same-sex
spouses.' 5 5 The ECJ or the collective member states may necessarily limit
amendments or agree that member states cannot opt out when basic
human rights are concerned. Limiting excusals would ensure that the
entire EU respects these rights and further the EU's goals of promoting the
fundamental rights of its citizens.
156
Since the birth of the EU, member states have slowly transferred
power to the EU. 15 7 The number of member states in the European Com-
munity has gradually increased. This increase has created the problem of
having many different forms of social policy and many different view-
points on social issues. The lack of recognition of same-sex marriages cur-
rently affects only a few individuals,15 8 which may allow the ECJ to defer
to the laws of the sovereign member states that do not recognize same-sex
marriages. The increase in same-sex marriages, however, will pressure the
ECJ to favor individual rights over state sovereignty. 159 Although there
may be backlash from the more conservative member states, the ECJ may
have to make progressive changes to achieve greater Community unity
160
and political stability.
16 1
Conclusion
The laws of the Netherlands and Belgium that allow same-sex mar-
riages began a series of reforms that may lead to new rights for same-sex
partners. Not only did the Netherlands and Belgium grant domestic rights,
but as members of the EU, they may have also carved a path for same-sex
partners' rights throughout Europe. If the ECJ hears a case, several mem-
ber states would likely support a ruling favorable to the recognition of
same-sex marriages throughout the EU. The Netherlands and Belgium
could convincingly argue that the ECJ cannot permit a state to restrict one
of the four freedoms and refuse to recognize a marriage.
154. Jacques Vandamme, European Federalism: Opportunity or Utopia?, in THE EURO-
PEAN UNION BEYOND AMSTERDAM: NEW CONCEPTS IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 149 (Martin
Westlake ed., 1998) (discussing the progress the EU has made integrating).
155. See Carolan, supra note 148, at 405.
156. Id. at 395.
157. MacLean, supra note 92, at 536.
158. See Statistics Netherlands, supra note 3 (noting that only 10 per cent of same-sex
couples are married).
159. See Kristen L. Walker, Evolving Human Rights Norms Around Sexuality, 6 ILSAJ.
INT'L & COMP. L. 343, 345 (2000) (discussing the varying success that homosexuals
have had in invoking the right to equality).
160. See Low, supra note 78, at 191 (describing the commitment to greater unity laid
out in the Treaty Preamble).
161. See Vandamme, supra note 154, at 148-50; Carolan, supra note 148, at 395.
216 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 37
Even as this ruling promotes political and social integration, it may
inevitably stress relations between member states. If more member states
request amendments and exceptions to agreements, the Community may
need to restrict states that bargain out of treaty provisions and judicial
decisions. The EC will have to decide whether the goals of economic and
social unity merit restricted deference to the public policies of member
states. Regardless of whether the EC decides to restrict deference, the
Community must continue to develop systems of recourse, short of
allowing protocols, to remain a functioning body that is progressing. With-
out progression, the EC will not be prepared to handle the political fallout
that issues such as the recognition of same-sex marriages could cause
among an ideologically diverse union.
